al-Dawwānī's commentary on al-Suhrawardī's Hayākil al-nūr.

This article examines the current problems and tension that characterize the idea of the right to have rights, considered as a cornerstone of the European Union's project. The systemic deficit matter is discussed as the main problematic to achieve the entirety of the previous concept, and some systemic deficit profile are identified. Moreover through the example of the Greek experience the article shows a possible way of common action to solve the systemic deficit. Finally, the authors talk about how to (...) evaluate these kind of interventions and what are their risks. (shrink)

Among the various questions on different subjects attributed to Albert the Great, and presumably disputed in Paris around the middle of the 13th century, we find one – handed down mainly under the title De quiditate et esse – dedicated to the presentation of some fundamental notions of metaphysics. This particular question deserves attention insofar as it represents a significant moment in the geneaology of the distinction between the notions of res a ratitudine and res a reor reris. A final (...) remark concerns the possible connection between Albert the Great and Henry of Ghent with respect to the transcendental primacy of res and the attempt not to reduce the consideration of metaphysics to actual being alone. (shrink)

As its title suggests, Mondin’s book is encyclopedic. It treats of theological language from the Greeks—in fact, Plato and Aristotle with very brief mention of others—to the present time. The entries are necessarily short but Karl Barth, Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann among the moderns and Augustine and Aquinas among the classics get complete chapters to themselves. Heidegger does not, perhaps surprisingly, receive separate treatment although he is referred to as the source of both Gadamer and Ricoeur and specifically as (...) the source of the overcoming of the subject-object schema and so of the new hermeneutics. One might have expected more discussion of Bultmann’s relation to Heidegger. The section on linguistic analysis in general and Wittgenstein in particular is quite short but, granted that the book is taken as an encyclopedic reference work, is quite useful for anyone unfamiliar with analysis who wanted to begin a study of the theory of theological language within this school. Indeed, the usefulness of the book as a reference work on the problem is its major merit. The essays or entries do not pretend to achieve more than a swift survey of the author or school treated. As an aid to work the book is worth having. No price is given; there is an index of authors mentioned which in most cases is accurate; the entry on Freud is wrongly noted at 435 instead of 434. The bibliographies are restricted to the footnotes which is perhaps slightly awkward and sometimes only the Italian translation of a book is given e.g. on page 460 footnote 66 there is a reference to MacQuarrie, Ha senso parlare di Dio? which, I presume, is a translation of God-Talk. The book would be a better instrument if the original titles were given as well. (shrink)

Il principale scopo di questo articolo è esplorare la legittimità e le implicazioni dell’ascrizione di valore intrinseco alla biodiversità. Svariati problemi ambientali stanno seriamente mettendo in crisi l’idea tradizionale secondo la quale la comunità morale dovrebbe essere ristretta ai soli esseri umani. In tale contesto, la ricerca filosofica è chiamata a una stimolante quanto urgente analisi della nozione di “biodiversità”. Tuttavia, alcuni eticisti ambientali continuano ad affermare che la biodiversità non abbia valore intrinseco. In questo contributo mostro che il concetto (...) di “valore intrinseco” ha diversi significati, a seconda che le sue basi siano epistemologiche, ontologiche, assiologiche o normative. Sostengo dunque che, mentre la biodiversità non ha valore di per sé (in its own right), in sé (in itself), o per sé (for its own sake), può esser considerata avere un valore in quanto tale (as such). Sostengo inoltre che ascrivere un valore intrinseco alla biodiversità permette una riconciliazione autentica tra gli interessi antropocentrici e il bisogno di estendere la comunità morale oltre l’umanità. (shrink)

Civil rights; human rights; law; philosophical aspects; idealism, German; philosophy, German.

O presente artigo pretende esboçar um paralelo entre duas obras da filosofia política: o opúsculo inacabado “Do reino ou do governo dos príncipes ao Rei de Chipre” de São Tomás de Aquino, e o conhecido “O Príncipe” de Nicolau Maquiavel. O cotejo dos textos permite aproximações diretas entre dois momentos filosóficos distantes através da temática similar, pelo tratamento filosófico da tradição clássica, e pela sutileza do argumento que relaciona o bem comum com o privado, nas relações políticas. A análise divide-se (...) em duas partes temáticas: a definição de governante, e, as características de seu ofício. Em Tomás, articula-se a influência da política aristotélica com o modo como a finalidade privada do governante se estabelece numa hierarquia dos fins, justificadora do governo e direcionada ao bem comum. Em Maquiavel se observa uma recepção diferente do pensamento antigo, ligado à retórica romana, e uma hierarquia própria dos fins, que se direciona, de modo semelhante ao tomasiano, para o bem comum, mas com um tratamento diferente quanto a como esse bem público se relaciona com o bem privado, tanto do governante, quanto do povo que lhe é sujeito. Desta comparação conclui-se por uma necessidade de estabelecer a complexidade da filosofia política na passagem da idade média para o renascimento que afaste a ideia de uma ruptura total, e permita entender como a idade moderna partilha, em continuidade, elementos medievais e os desenvolve muito mais do que os abandona. (shrink)

_Riassunto_: Il dibattito contemporaneo sull’impatto causale degli stati mentali e delle decisioni consce sui fenomeni naturali e sociali fa largo uso di dati ricavati da test neurofisiologici e comportamentali, che esplorano il ruolo di processi cognitivi inconsci e interpretazioni post-hoc caratterizzate da intenzionalità dichiarativa. I dati neuroscientifici sono spesso utilizzati per sostenere una prospettiva fisicalista che privilegia il determinismo neurocognitivo rispetto alle discussioni sul libero arbitrio. Tuttavia, questa impostazione tende a ignorare, almeno parzialmente, il dibattito sui limiti epistemologici e tecnici (...) nella generazione dei dati e i pregiudizi filosofici insiti nelle interpretazioni. Questo lavoro evidenzia tali limiti, proponendo un’analisi filosofica della relazione complessa tra razionalità, esercizio del libero arbitrio e costruzione dell’identità personale. Distinguendo il concetto di scelta autentica da quello di impulso o spinta ad agire, si sostiene una concezione enattiva e fenomenologica dell’azione umana libera, offrendo così un’interpretazione del libero arbitrio che respinge l’eliminativismo come inadeguato. Rifiutando un dualismo semplicistico, il libero arbitrio viene definito come la capacità di una soggettività incarnata, situata ed enattiva di interagire con un ambiente naturale e sociale attraverso compiti che implicano processi stratificati di valutazione e decisione. In conclusione, si argomenta che, sebbene le scienze fisiche e psicologiche possano indagare le basi dell’esecuzione dell’azione, non sono in grado di risolvere né di spiegare l’aspetto più complesso del processo decisionale stratificato ed esteso. Questo riguarda la relazione intenzionale tra la persona, considerata nella sua interezza, e un mondo ricco di valori, che conferisce senso e orientamento alle scelte individuali. Parole chiave: Libertà; Persona; Cervello; Inconscio; Determinismo/Eliminativismo; Thomas Fuchs _Embodied freedom. The role of person in decision-making_ _Abstract_: The contemporary debate on the causal impact of mental states and conscious decisions on natural and social phenomena extensively relies on data derived from neurophysiological and behavioral tests. These tests investigate the role of unconscious cognitive processes and post-hoc interpretations characterized by declarative intentionality. Neuroscientific data are often employed to support a physicalist perspective that prioritizes neurocognitive determinism over discussions of free will. However, this approach tends to partially overlook the epistemological and technical limitations inherent in data generation and the philosophical biases embedded in interpretations. This paper highlights these limitations by proposing a philosophical analysis of the complex relationship between rationality, the exercise of free will, and the construction of personal identity. By distinguishing the concept of genuine choice from that of impulse or urge to act, it advocates for an enactive and phenomenological conception of human free action, offering an interpretation of free will that rejects eliminativism as inadequate. Rejecting a simplistic dualism, free will is defined as the capacity of an embodied, situated, and enactive subjectivity to engage with a natural and social environment through tasks involving layered processes of evaluation and decision-making. In conclusion, it is argued that while physical and psychological sciences may explore the foundations of action execution, they cannot resolve nor explain the more complex aspect of the stratified and extended decision-making process. This aspect concerns the intentional relationship between the person, considered as a whole, and a world rich in values, which gives meaning and direction to individual choices. _Keywords_: Freedom; Person; Brain; Unconscious; Determinism/Eliminativism; Thomas Fuchs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Way to Ethical CultureThe Meaning of Art as Oscillating between the Other, Il y a, and the ThirdRossitsa Varadinova Borkowski (bio)Who can suppose that a poet capable of effectively introducing into his scenes rhetoricians, generals and various other characters, each displaying some peculiar excellence, was nothing more than a droll or juggler, capable only of cheating or flattering his hearer, and not of instructing him?Are we all (...) agreed that the chief merit of a poet consists in his accurate representation of the affairs of life? Can this be done by a mere driveller, unacquainted with the world?The excellence of a poet is not to be measured by the same standard as that of a mechanic or a blacksmith, where honor and virtue have nothing to do with our estimate. But the poet and the individual are connected, and he only can become a good poet who is in the first instance a worthy man.— Strabo, The Geography of StraboAfter Emmanuel Levinas showed the need for radically positing the Ethical as the original structure of human inwardness and as art is a fundamental aspect of being human, a reexamination of the meaning of the Artistic and its relation with the Ethical is necessary.1 Throughout [End Page 195] the history of Western thought and culture, the meaning of art has been regarded either as imitation of the world and nature (Plato and Aristotle), objective self-expression of the Absolute Spirit (Hegel) or Being (Heidegger), a subjective “free play of imagination” and judgment (Kant and the Romanticists), or as inevitable engagement with social issues and political position (the Marxists and Sartre). In spite of the variety of theories and views about the essence and value of art, it is unquestionable that the Artistic has transformational power over humans, which points to art’s connection with ethics. Therefore, following Levinas, instead of asking the general ontological questions about the gist of art “What is art?” or “Why is there art instead of something else?” we should seek an answer to the ethical question about the meaning of art: “How can the existence of art be justified?”The answers could be sought in two directions. The first already quite well beaten path explores Levinas’s own vision on art, which most critics find hesitant or even ambiguous.2 The impression of this hesitation is significant on the background of Levinas’s rigorous clarity about the Ethical. Overlooking this impression would lead to conclusions that would deviate our attention from the main question about how the existence of art can be justified. A possible explanation would be that Levinas’s seemingly fragmentary thoughts about art are woven into the fabric of his ultimate meta-ethical project — that is, his approach to art is instrumental, subjected to the Ethical. For example, commentators agree that Levinas’s early article “Reality and Its Shadow” (1948) is the only one exclusively focused on art and use it as a starting point to assemble the fragments of his aesthetic views into an aesthetic theory. Although this move might be justified methodologically, Levinas is clear that the discussion of art in this article is subordinated to the more general (and more serious) question about the nontruth of being (LR 132). Positing art as mythological and mystical, thus incapable of transmitting a meaningful message if separated from philosophical criticism (142), Levinas puts “in brackets” the discussion about the artistic and focuses on the reason qua knowledge (philosophy) and its relation with the Other. The impression of his hesitation about art’s [End Page 196] independent capability to dephase the instant, to breach the ontological gravity, and to expose the human spirit to the Ethical comes from those texts where Levinas applies his own vision about the integrative role of philosophical criticism — i.e., texts that work as philosophical criticism of art: “Transcendence through poetry — is this serious?”3 (PN 175n12), “if poetry can contain teachings” (165; emphasis added). Therefore, on one hand, Levinas exhaustively scrutinizes all possibilities of ethics of philosophy and comes to the clear position that in order for reason to function humanly it should be dethroned by the Other. He is... (shrink)

This is an era when the Islamic World is making a range of attempts to redefine itself and to grapple with the challenges of modernity. Many schools of thought have emerged which seek to position modern Islam within the context of a rapidly changing contemporary world. Exploring and defining the relationship between religion and knowledge, Ismail Rafi Al-Faruqi, a distinguished 20th century Arab-American scholar of Islam, formulated ideas which have made substantial contributions to the Islam-and-modernity discourse. His review of the (...) interaction between Islam and knowledge examines the philosophy behind this relationship, and the ways in which Islam can relate to our understanding of science, the arts, architecture, technology and other knowledge-based fields of enquiry. This book includes contributions from Seyyed Hossein Nasr, John Esposito, Charles Fletcher and others, and will prove an essential reference point for scholars of Islam and students of philosophy and comparative religion. (shrink)

This article aims to investigate and analyze Yusuf b. Muhammad Jān al-Karabāghī's (d. 1035/1626) treatise in which he discusses some issues related to existence (wujūd) and the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd). This study aims to bring this treatise of al-Karabāghī, which has not been studied yet, into the literature of the history of Islamic thought by investigating and analyzing its content. There is no information about Yusuf al-Karabāghī's birthplace and education in bio-bibliographical sources. It is known that he wrote works (...) in the fields of tafsīr and theology (kalām). Some of his works are Erbau' Ta'līkātin fi't-Tafsīr, Risāla fi'l-Mubāḥasa allatī waka'at fī surat al-Fath bayna al-ulamā, Hāshiya 'alā Sharhi'l-Aqā'id al-Adudiyya, Sharḥ Risāla Ithbāt al-wājib li al-Dawwānī. Three copies of this treatise, which is the subject of this study, have been identified in manuscript libraries. The first of these copies is listed as MS 791 in Selimiye Manuscript Library, the second is listed as MS 1210 in Suleymaniye Library, Carullah Efendi Collection, and the third is listed as 1960 in Suleymaniye Library, Manuscript Donations Collection. Among the mentioned copies, the copy registered in Selimiye Library ms. no 791 was preferred as the main one in the analysis both because it is very clear and readable, and because of the scribes’s collation note in the ferağ record. This is because the scribe wrote this copy in correspondence with other copies that existed in his period but have not survived to the present day. The author does not explicitly mention the name of this treatise in the introduction. In the introductory part of the treatise, he states that he has collected topics that will serve as a remedy for finding the right thought. When its content is analyzed, it is understood that the treatise includes some issues related to existence (wujūd) and especially the Necessary Being (wājib al-wujūd). It is seen that the author followed a different method in the treatise. Yusuf al-Qarabāghī divided the treatise into seven chapters, which he called "halwa". He also added subheadings to each section, sometimes one and sometimes two, which he called "waqf". In these sub-headings he added to each section, he included the views of a thinker who is an authority on the subject he examined. In the treatise, the author examines the methods of demonstration such as burhān al- tatbīq, burhān al- tazāyuf, burhān al-sullamī and concepts such as revolution, succession, wujūd, wājib al-wujūd, possible, qadīm, hadīth, cause, ma'lūl, complete cause, nūr, zulm, al-ālam al-misālī, berzāh, and juz al lā yetajjazā (jawhar al-fard). In this framework, he discusses Karabāğī's proof of the existence of the Necessary Being through the cancellation of the vicious circle and infinite regression (tasalsul), the unity of the Necessary Being (tawḥīd), the relation between essence and attribute, and the attribute of knowledge of the Necessary Being. As a result, in this treatise, Yusuf al-Karabāghī analyzed some debates and views on existence (wujūd) and the concept of Necessary Being, which is an important issue in the tradition of Islamic thought, employing his unique methodological approach. (shrink)

Pascal’s wager was sometimes viewed in the eighteenth-century as an argument conquering its whole demonstrative force not in the Pensées but in a passage of Locke’s Essay Concerning the Human Understanding (II, XXI, § 70) dealing with the preference to be given to a virtuous life when considering the possibility of another eternal life. In this paper, I intend to show that this interpretation is ill-founded. The argument of the wager highlights the discrepancy between the requirements of alethic reason on (...) the one side and of practical reason on the other side: the wager is to be seen not as a proposition, but as an act. When emphasizing the conditions on which this act can conform to rationality, the argument used of in the Pensées puts the comparison between a unity (my life ante mortem) and a multiplicity (other possible lives post mortem) on the front of the stage, in combination with a reckoning of the chances of winning or losing the bet on God’s existence. The reduction ad absurdum of the act of betting against God’s existence is deduced from a double infinitization, not only quantitative (an infinity of lives), but also qualitative (a reiterating infinity of happiness) of the second member in the comparison. Now, the case is different in Locke’s argumentation. Its reading is vitiated if we deem that the § 70 in the Essay II, XXI consists in a self-sufficient demonstration, understandable by itself. Through a close examination of the chapter XXI in its entire, it appears on the contrary that the thesis of an alleged improvement or even of a mere equivalent of Pascal’s wager in the Essay is defeated by the necessity to put back Locke’s own argument in its true place, actually as the result of a complex enquiry on the principle of the determination of the will. (shrink)

In De immortalitate animae Augustine is not satisfied with completing his proof of the immortality of the soul – which had been left open in the second book of the Soliloquies –; he also answers some possible objections, demonstrating that the rational soul cannot cease to exist, it cannot die, nor can it change into an irrational body or soul. Furthermore, remaining faithful to the programmatic declaration of never wanting to stray from the authority of Christ (Acad. 3, 20, 43), (...) he specifies the ontological status of the soul by affirming that it is, in itself, mutable and therefore not of a divine nature, as Varro had argued. Nor is it a substance foreign to the body, as the Platonists claimed, because the soul has an appetitus ad corpus and, if it questions itself, it easily discovers that it desires nothing else «except to do something, to know with intelligence or with the senses, or only to live, as far as this is in its power» (nisi agendi aliquid, aut sciendi, aut sentiendi, aut tantummodo vivendi in quantum sua illi potestas est). (shrink)

This is an era when the Islamic World is making a range of attempts to redefine itself and to grapple with the challenges of modernity. Many schools of thought have emerged which seek to position modern Islam within the context of a rapidly changing contemporary world. Exploring and defining the relationship between religion and knowledge, Ismail Rafi Al-Faruqi, a distinguished 20th century Arab-American scholar of Islam, formulated ideas which have made substantial contributions to the Islam-and-modernity discourse. His review of the (...) interaction between Islam and knowledge examines the philosophy behind this relationship, and the ways in which Islam can relate to our understanding of science, the arts, architecture, technology and other knowledge-based fields of enquiry. This book includes contributions from Seyyed Hossein Nasr, John Esposito, Charles Fletcher and others, and will prove an essential reference point for scholars of Islam and students of philosophy and comparative religion. (shrink)

Riassunto: Tra i disturbi del linguaggio, il deficit di tipo pragmatico viene spesso osservato nelle persone a seguito di trauma cranio-encefalico. Nonostante sia negletta nella pratica clinica, questa componente gioca un ruolo centrale nella qualità di vita di persone con TCE. L’aspetto peculiare del deficit di tipo pragmatico è la sua natura intrinsecamente connessa sia ad altre capacità di tipo cognitivo che relazionali delle persone fin nella storia pre-morbosa. L’obiettivo di questo lavoro è proporre un punto di vista teorico che, (...) beneficiando del dialogo tra neuropsicologia e fenomenologia, possa costituire un paradigma utile per considerare in modo più sistematico il deficit di tipo pragmatico. Piuttosto che frammentarlo e ridurlo solo a una lista di singoli sintomi, esso viene analizzato come conseguenza di un’alterazione non storica dell’ ipseità, mettendolo in relazione con il concetto di “ embodiment ”. Si avanza, in conclusione, una possibile proposta di presa in carico di tale neuropsicopatologia. Parole chiave: Trauma cranio-encefalico; Pragmatica; Comunicazione; Embodiment; Fenomenologia Pragmatic disorder due to TBI: A phenomenological approach to rehabilitation –: People who suffer from traumatic brain injury are frequently affected by pragmatic disorder, among other communicative impairments. While largely neglected in terms of rehabilitation strategies, the skills impaired by PD play a fundamental role in the quality of life of people who suffer from TBI. PD uniquely impacts a person’s cognitive and interpersonal abilities, including those from their pre-morbid history. The aim of this work is to propose a theoretical framework, based on a dialogue between neuropsychology and phenomenology, that may provide a useful paradigm in approaches to rehabilitation in PD. Instead of fragmenting this disorder into a list of symptoms, we address it as a consequence of a non-historical alteration of “ ipseity” in connection with the concept of “ embodiment”. In conclusion, we suggest an intervention for this neuropsychopathology. Keywords: Traumatic Brain Injury; Pragmatics; Communication; Embodiment; Phenomenology. (shrink)

Nella conferenza su Le cinéma et la nouvelle psychologie Merleau-Ponty introduce una singolare, ma decisiva notazione sull’arte filmica, legandola alla nozione di “ritmo”. Tale nozione dà avvio a una riflessione sull’immagine e sul rapporto tra l’immagine e lo sguardo dello spettatore al cinema. Nel presente articolo, l’uso che Merleau-Ponty ne fa e il senso di questa operazione saranno letti in riferimento alla riflessione di Émile Benveniste sul ritmo e ad alcune annotazioni contenute nei corsi di Merleau-Ponty al Collège de France, (...) di qualche anno successivi alla conferenza, su Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression e quello sulle Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage. Dans le texte de sa conférence sur Le cinéma et la nouvelle psychologie, Merleau-Ponty introduit une lecture, singulière mais décisive, de l’art filmique, en la rapprochant de la notion de « rythme ». Cette notion engage une réflexion sur l’image et sur le rapport entre l’image et le regard du spectateur au cinéma. Dans cet article, l’utilisation que Merleau-Ponty en fait et le sens de cette opération seront lus à partir de la réflexion d’Émile Benveniste sur le rythme et à partir de certaines notes présentes dans les cours de Merleau-Ponty au Collège de France sur Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression et sur les Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage, qui suivent de quelques années la conférence.In the text of his lecture on “Film and the new psychology,” Merleau-Ponty introduces a singular and decisive reading of filmic art, approaching the notion of “rhythm.” This notion engages in a reflection on image and on the relation between the image and the gaze of the spectator at the cinema. In this article, Merleau-Ponty’s actual usage of this notion and the meaning of this operation will be read starting from the reflection of Émile Benveniste on rhythm as well as certain notes presented in Merleau-Ponty’s courses at the Collège de France on The sensible world and the world of expression and Research on the literary usages of language, that follow some years after the lecture. (shrink)

L’intento del lavoro è di problematizzare alcuni aspetti, generalmente ritenuti emblematici, della relazione tra i litterati medievali e il libro – nelle sue declinazioni di Testo sacro, Libro della natura e auctoritates . L’impiego, come strumenti di lavoro, di concetti di recente elaborazione e di osservazioni di pensatori contemporanei sull’argomento, non è finalizzato ad attualizzare tale relazione, quanto piuttosto ad ampliare i punti di vista su di essa e a metterne alla prova la capacità di offrire originali spunti di riflessione. (...) Le proposte teoriche di Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault e Roland Barthes sono qui adoperate come esemplificazioni di un’interpretazione che ha storicamente reso quasi paradigmatico il modo di leggere dei docti , specialmente altomedievali. Tuttavia, alcune definizioni della Scrittura – il libro per eccellenza – proposte da questi ultimi, nonché la teorizzazione del suo quadruplice senso sembrano smussare la radicalità di queste osservazioni. Concetti quali “funzione-autore” di Foucault e “testo” di Barthes sono invece adottati per considerare all’interno di una diversa cornice teorica il confronto dei doctores , in particolare bassomedievali, con le cosiddette auctoritates . Nella visione ordinaria la reverenza nei confronti dell’autore, divino o umano, la ricerca e la riproposizione fedele di un significato univoco dell’opera aldilà dei segni, naturali o culturali, che lo veicolano costituiscono tratti tipici dell’atteggiamento dei lettori medievali. A fronte di questi aspetti, tuttavia, è possibile sottolinearne altri eterodossi e perlopiù trascurati, quali la rilevanza attribuita all’interpretazione, prassi ineludibile e da disciplinare, al ruolo del lettore e alla sua fruizione attiva e produttiva dei testi. The aim of the work is to problematize some aspects generally considered representative of the relationship between medieval savants and the book - in its variations of Bible, Book of Nature and so-called auctoritates . The use, as tools, of newly developed concepts and observations of contemporary thinkers on this subject, is not aimed at updating this relationship, but rather at expanding the points of view on it and testing its ability to adduce original food for thought. The theoretical suggestions of Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes are used here as examples of an interpretation that has historically made almost paradigmatic the way of reading of early medieval writers. However, some definitions of Scripture - the book by definition - proposed by them and the theory of its fourfold sense seem to blunt these drastic observations. Concepts such as Foucault’s "author-function" or Barthes’ "text" are used to consider in a different theoretical context the relation between late medieval thinkers and the so-called auctoritates . In ordinary vision the reverence for the divine or human author, the research and the revival of a true single meaning of his work beyond its natural or cultural signs are typical features of the attitude of medieval readers. In relation to these aspects, however, it is possible to highlight other heterodox and less considered ones, such as the importance given to the interpretation, inescapable practice that has to be regulated, to the reader’s role and to his active and productive use of texts. (shrink)

Ḥadīths have been preserved and recorded in various ways since the Companions. These activities continued dur-ing the Tābiīn (the successors of the Companions) Period. So much so that these methods have formed the infra-structure of other methods that will emerge later. In this context, before the 70's (A.H.), works named al-Aṭrāf appeared. However, these first works consisted of the notes that they wrote some of the ḥadīths before coming to the science assemblies to help students remember in ḥadīth learning. Ḥadīth (...) scholars have adopted and applied this method in a very short time. Thus, this method also provided the opportunity for the formation of the first written ḥadīth documents. In addition, with the writing of ḥadīth works, it has turned into a system of al-Taṣnīf and al-Takhrīj in order to make maximum use of these books and to reach the source of a narration that is tried to be found. As a result, al-Aṭrāf literature, which can be evaluated as index, has emerged. As a matter of fact, the first examples of this literature, arranged alphabetically according to the names of the Companions or ḥadīth texts, started to be given since the 4th (A.H.) century. In this way, the way to quickly benefit from the accumulation of the ḥadīth area has been opened. This article focuses on the historical adventure of al-Aṭrāf and their contributions to the ḥadīth field, as well as literature knowledge of the works of al-Aṭrāf which are of great importance for both al-Kitābah, al-Taṣnīf and al-Takhrīj.Summary: In order to understand and practice the religion of Islām, great efforts have been made both in the past and later periods in order to convey the words, verbs, interpretations and qualifications of the Prophet to the next genera-tions as they are protected from all kinds of falsification and changes. This process, which started with memoriza-tion and partly writing at the beginning, has gained momentum with the use of other methods since the period of Tābiīn. In this context, the method of aṭrāf was started to be used to facilitate memorization, to be a reminder, and to transmit the ḥadīth through the hearing of the ḥadīth sheikh. The first examples of this method were seen by Muḥammad b. Sīrīn during his participation of his teacher Abīde/Ubayda Salmān in the scholarly assembly. At this stage, the relevant method was manifested as writing a passage from the beginning of the ḥadīth. Thus, the aforementioned method, which had great contributions in recording and memorizing ḥadīths in accordance with the original, has gained widespreadness and application among the ḥadīth scholars like Ubeydullaḥ b. Omar, Shu’bah b. al-Ḥajjāj, Sufyān as-Sawrī, Mālik b. Anas, Ismāīl b. Ayyāş and Vakī b. Jarrāḥ in a very short time. In this context, Yazīd b. Zuray’ stated that he went to his teacher without his aṭrāf work of ḥadīths which he transmitted from Shu’bah and listened to ḥadīth in this way. Therefore, this mentioned event is important in terms of putting forth that Shu’bah allowed the aṭrāf method in his assemblies. The method was used by Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, who traveled to Madīnah to convey the reports recorded with the mentioned method of his teacher Abū Alḳama al-Farawī and at the same time listen to the related transfers from him, but who could not reach his goal. Therefore, the related narrations show that aṭrāf method was used effectively by ḥadīth scholars to remember the ḥadīths in the 1st and 2nd centuries, so sections from the narrations were written during the preparatory stage before coming to the scholarly assembly. Ultimately, the importance of these works, which manifest in different ways and offer great contributions to writing, is an undeniable reality for the history of ḥadīth.Aṭrāf, the plural form of taraf that literally means the side and edge of something, mean a section, phrase or first part that indicates the whole of the ḥadīth. This method, along with the formation of ḥadīth literature, has been started to be given as a name to the works organized alphabetically according to the name of the Companions or ḥadīth texts by mentioning some of the ḥadīths with the 4th century. In this sense, aṭrāf has started to become a unique literature in a sort of taṣnīf and takhrīj method in order to make use of the ḥadīth writing easier.Aṭrāf studies may aim to bring together the isnāḍs (chains of transmitters) in all books, or they can be limited to the chains in certain books. Aṭrāf books contain the ḥadīths in the Ṣaḥīḥān or Kutub al-Sittah and are written in alphabetical form based on the name of the companions or according to the texts of ḥadīth. The first of these, which has the attribute of the musnad in a sense, is arranged in alphabetical order according to the name of the Companion, and if there are many people who narrate from him, according to the names of the tābiīn and taba-i tābiīn (successors of the tābiīn). Accordingly, the narrations of each companion were determined and listed in al-phabetical order in aṭrāfs in musnad-type, and a passage was written from the ḥadīths and marked as books/chapters in the places of relevant narration. On the other hand, the second type of aṭrāf books were ar-ranged by giving a few words from a section that allows remembering the head or all of the ḥadīths without in-cluding chains, and then placing these texts in alphabetical order.The type of aṭrāf offers the opportunity to see different chains of narrations together and provides many facilities for the ḥadīth researchers. Therefore, ḥadīth researchers show great interest in this genre. Aṭrāfs provide many benefits for both ḥadīth chain and text. In this respect, it is possible to talk about many advantages of the ḥadīth to its transmister such as the determination of mutawātīr, garīb, azīz, mashhūr, mutābī or the testimony of ḥadīth; to provide facility to make a reputation research of a riwāyah (narration), to provide an opportunity to determine the location of the narrations in the primary sources; to detect the link or any blackout in the chain, to reach the nu-merical knowledge of ḥadīth narrated by a companion or other narrators, to obtain information about narrators whose identity is not explicitly stated, to know the first narrator, to provide the protection of the ḥadīths from taḥrīf or alteration, to give the opportunity to identify the subject they contain, to be able to obtain text integrity by getting various chains, the detection of the sabab al-wurūd (the context of ḥadīth).Due to the contributions we have mentioned above, many books on aṭrāf literature that started with Abu’l-Ḥasen Ali b. Omar ad-Dārakutnī have been published. Among them Aṭrāfu’s-ṣaḥīḥayn/el-Jem`u bayna’s-ṣaḥīḥayn by Abū Mas`ūd Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. Ubayd ad-Dimashkī, Aṭrāfu’s-ṣaḥīḥayn by Abū Muḥammad Ḥalaf b. Muḥammad b. Ali al-Vasiṭī, Zaḫāiru’l-mavārīs fi’d-dalālati alā mavāzi`i’l-hadīs by Abdülganī b. İsmāīl en-Nāblūsī and Tuḥfatu’l-ashrāf bi ma`rifati’l-aṭrāf by Abu’l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf b. Abdurrahman el-Mizzī can be mentioned. Some of the related works are arranged in musnad style while others are arranged according to the first word of ḥadīth texts. As a result, the method of aṭrāf has become a kind of indexer in order to facilitate reaching the source of the re-ports and make the highest level of use required by the classification and bookings of the ḥadīths in the 3rd centu-ry. These works, arranged alphabetically in the name of the Companions or according to the texts of the ḥadīth, have taken their place in the history of the ḥadīth with their many examples, both in the form of taṣnīf and the method of takhrīj by mentioning a part of the ḥadīth by the head. (shrink)

Excerpt from Le Teorie Dello Spazio e del Tempo nella Filosofia Greca Fin Ad Aristotele Tuttavia non può dirsi, che, prima di Platone e di Aristotele, non si sia trattato affatto di questo soggetto. Naturalmente il problema non poteva allora presentarsi sotto il medesimo aspetto, col quale si presentava ai due summenzionati filosofi: ma pure i' argomento, intorno a cui si aggiravano le ricerche dei primi pensatori greci, era, senza alcun dubbio, tale, che di per se stesso offriva molteplici occasioni (...) a questo riguardo. È noto, che tal argomento consiste nel modo, come essi dovessero spiegarsi e rappresentarsi il mondo esteriore che ne circonda, o, per parlare con maggior precisione. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

I intend to: a) clarify the origins and de facto meanings of the term relativism; b) reconstruct the reasons for the birth of the thesis named “cultural relativism”; d) reconstruct ethical implications of the above thesis; c) revisit the recent discussion between universalists and particularists in the light of the idea of cultural relativism.. -/- 1.Prescriptive Moral Relativism: “everybody is justified in acting in the way imposed by criteria accepted by the group he belongs to”. Universalism: there are at least (...) some judgments which are valid inter-culturally Absolutism: there are at least some particular prescriptions which are valid without exception everywhere and always -/- 2. The traditional proof of prescriptive moral relativism: the argument from variability: Judgments, rules, and shared values are de facto variable in time and space. The traditional counter-proof: examples of variability do not prove what skeptics contend. -/- 3. Pre-history of the doctrine -Ancient sophists: either immoralist or contractualist -Modern moral scepticism (xvii c.): variability as an historical and ethnographic fact supports a sceptical conclusion more moderate than sheer immoralism. - Voltaire, Kant, Reid counter-attack pointing at a universally shared moral sense - Romantics and idealists stage an even more moderate reformulation: instead of universally shared moral sense they point at the Spirit of a People which is: a)alternative to abstract and universal philosophical systems as far as it is lived ‘culture’; b) indivisible unity with an inner harmony and a source of normative standards; c) dynamic, in so far as it is a manifestation of the Spirit through the becoming of National cultures. -/- 4. The birth of Cultural Relativism and its ethical implications 4.1. The 18th c. doctrine was the noble savage (a non-historical doctrine: state of nature vs. social state) 4.2 Edward Tylor (1832-1817) and ethnocentric historicism Savage moral standards are real enough, but they are far and weaker than ours. 4.3 Boas and Malinowski and an holistic reaction to ethnocentric historicism -/- Franz Boas (1858-1942): a) Development of civilizations is not ruled by technical progress nor does it follow a one-way path; instead there are parallel developments (for ex. Agriculture does not follow stock-raising); b) racial characters have no relevance in development of civilization; c) we are not yet in a position to compare externally identical kinds of behaviour till we have not yet understood beliefs and intentions laying at their roots (for ex.: “From an ethnological point of view murder cannot be considered as a single phenomenon”; d) we should distinguish among different practices which are only superficially similar (fro ex. practices traditionally classified under the label “tabù”); e) there is as a fact just one normative ethic, constant in its contents but varying in its extension; f) the implication is not that we cannot judge behavior by members of other groups; it is only a recommendation of caution. -/- Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942): a) against Tylor’s and Frazer’s “magpie” methodology, field-work is required, a culture as a whole should be observed from inside; individual elements are incomprehensible; b) a culture is an organic whole; c) its elements are accounted for by their function (economy), avoiding non-observables (empio-criticism). -/- Ruth Benedict and Melville Herskovitz identify Boas’s approach with “cultural relativism”. Benedict: what is normal and abnormal is to be judged on a culture’s own standards, not on our own (“Anthropology and the Abnormal”). Herskovits: “Boas adumbrates what we have come to call cultural relativism” (The Mind, p. 10); “Judgements are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation” (Man and his Works). -/- 4. How analytic philosophy understood and misunderstood the discussion 4.1. At the beginning of the 20th c., the new view in ethics was non-cognitivism (emotivist and subjectivist). Eric Westermark combines this view with an old-style ethnographic approach in support of relativity of moralities. Moralities are codes, or systems of emotive ‘disinterested’ reactions selected by evolution on their usefulness in terms of survival value for the society that is the carrier of such systems or codes. The moral relativity thesis: there are cases of disagreement that cannot be settled even after agreement about facts. 4.2 Anti-realists Brandt, Mackie, Gilbert, Harman adopt Westermark’s approach in a more sophisticated version: a) moralities are codes with an overall function and may be appraised only as wholes; b) variability is an argument for moral subjectivism; c) apparent legitimacy of deriving shift from ought is legitimized only within one institution d) morality should not be described but instead made, and existing moralities may be improved. Is it ‘real’ relativism? It is clearly subjectivism (a metaethical thesis). The normative thesis is that there better and worse codes, and survival values is the normative standard. -/- 4.3 Particularists MacIntyre, Sandel, Taylor, Wiggins, McDowell ‘Wittgensteinian’ prospectivist arguments bent to support weak-relativist claims MacIntyre: there is ‘incommensurability’ between different theoretical systems in both science and ethics. No argument is possible through different systems Different traditions may coexist for a long time without being able to bring their conflicts to a rational solution. -/- 4.4 Kantian universalists Baier, Gewirth, Rawls, Apel, Habermas Shared claim: justice concerns the right and is universal in so far as it may be based on minimal assumptions Other virtues are relative to context in so far as they are related to comprehensive views of the good - O’Neill criticism: a) it is an assumption shared by both alignments; b) after an alleged crisis brought about by alleged loss of metaphysical certainties, theories of justice have dropped demanding assumptions and kept universalism, virtue theories have kept demanding assumptions and dropped universalism; c) the opposition of virtue and justice has arisen in an unjustified way. O’Neill’s positive proposal: ‘constructive’ procedures may be adopted both (i) concerning all the range of virtues and (ii) across cultures once we abandon idealization and confine ourselves to abstraction from real-world cases. -/- 4.5 A metaethical relativist and anti-relativist normative ethicists: Bernard Williams Williams: vulgar relativism may be assumed to claim that: a) 'just' means 'just in a given society'; b) 'just in a given society' is to be understood in functionalist sense; c) it is wrong for one society’s members to condemn another society’s values. It is inconsistent since in (c) uses ‘just’ in a non-relative way that has been excluded in (a). William’s positive proposal: i) keep a number of substantive or thick ethical concepts that will be different in space and time; ii) admit that public choices are to be legitimized through recourse to more abstract procedures and relying on more thin ethical concepts. -/- 5. Critical remarks 5.1 The only real relativism available is ‘vulgar’ relativism (Westermark?) 5.2. Descriptive universalism (or absolutism) has a long pedigree, from Cicero on, reaching Boas himself but it is useless as an answer to normative questions 5.3. Twentieth-century philosophical discussion seems to discuss an ad hoc doctrine reconstructed by assembling obsolete philosophical ideas but ignoring the real theory of cultural relativism as formulated by anthropologists. -/- 6. A distinction between ethoi and ethical theories as a way out of confusions a)There are systems of conventions de facto existing. These may be studies from outside as phenomena or facts. b)There is moral argument and this, when studies from outside, is a fact, but this does not influence in any degree the possible validity of claims advanced. c) the difference between the above claims and Mackie’s criticism to Searle’s argument of the promising game is that promises, arguments etc. are also phenomena, but they are also communicative phenomena with a logical and pragmatic structure. -/- 7.Conclusions: a) cultural relativism, as a name for Boas’s methodology is a valuable discovery, and in this sense we are all relativists; b) ethical relativism, as an alleged implication of cultural relativism, has been argued in a philosophically quite unsophisticated way by Benedict and Herskovits; philosophers apparently discussed ethical relativism in the basis of a rather faint impression of what cultural relativism had been. c) a full-fledged ethical relativism has hardly been defended by anybody among philosophers; virtually no modern philosopher really argued a prescriptive version of the thesis; d) we may accept the grain of truth in ethical relativism by including relativist critique to ethical absolutism into a universalist normative doctrine that be careful in separating open-textured formulations of universal claims from culturally conditioned particular prescriptions. -/- . 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L’articolo si propone di chiarire uno dei punti oscuri della biografia di Giordano Bruno. Nel 1571 il Capitolo generale dei Domenicani di Roma lo assegnò come studente formale allo Studio di Andria. Secondo i suoi più importanti biografi, il Nolano non ci sarebbe mai andato. Attraverso l’accurata analisi dei documenti relativi al corso di studi, e il riscontro delle citazioni contenute in alcune opere, l’ipotesi che Bruno abbia soggiornato ad Andria per circa un anno appare, invece, estremamente probabile. The article (...) tries to clarify one of the obscure points of Giordano Bruno’s biography. In 1571 the General Chapter of the Dominicans in Rome assigned him, as a formal student, to the Study of Andria. According to his most important biographers, the Nolan never went there. However, through the careful analysis of the documents relating to his course of studies, and the comparison of the quotations contained in some of his works, the hypothesis that Bruno stayed in Andria for about a year appears extremely probable. (shrink)

Based on new findings about the emergence and transmission of Aristotle’s corpus in late antiquity, the paper tackles a most controversial issue : the relation of Father and Son in Symbols of Nicaea (325) and of Constantinople (381) from the strict point of view of the Greek word and concept οὐσία. The concept is shown to evolve in a few decades from individual οὐσία (e.g., Socrates and Callias), as in the Categories, to οὐσία as immaterial substance as in Metaphysics Lambda. (...) First parchment copies of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and of the corpus, probably kept in Constantinople since about 352 AD, played a possible role. (shrink)

Theon of Smyrna was a professor of Platonism and, as the Platonists of his age, an exegete of the Timaeus. The only work we have, the Expositio rerum mathematicarum ad legendum Platonem utilium, is complete and consistent: it discusses the foundations and the characteristics of the τάξις that makes the world well structured. Theon found this doctrine in the Timaeus and in the Epinomis, and he argued it again through mathematical illustrations with the aim of demonstrating, according to Plato, the (...) presence of harmony both in the incorporeal and in the corporeal realm: Theon’s purpose can’t be grasped without referring to his platonic exegetical activity. (shrink)

IT_Nel panorama analitico emerge la gura di Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. Ella, accanto a suo marito Peter Geach e al losofo Anthony Kenny, è stata indicata da John Haldane, tra i promotori di una nuova corrente denominata “tomismo analitico”. In questo saggio, oltre a sottolineare le debolezze che sono presenti in tale dicitura e allo stesso tempo il carattere innovativo della ri essione di questi loso , si è scelto di ripercorrere in modo critico le pagine che Anscombe dedica ad (...) un tema caro ai loso sin dalla classicità, vale a dire il tema della “sostanza”. È possibile, così, mostrare come tale concetto abbia subito delle modi che lungo tutta la storia del pensiero e, in ne, chiarire la de nizione che ne dà Anscombe. In conclusione, vengono presi in considerazioni quelli che possono essere con- siderati, sia in positivo che in negativo, i punti rilevanti della questione. EN_In the analytic philosophical panorama it is very relevant the gure of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe. Along her husband Peter Geach and the philosopher Anthony Kenny, she was identi ed by John Haldane as one of the promoters of a new philosophical current called “Analytical Thomism”. In this paper, in addition to highlighting the weaknesses that is present in this statement and at the same time the character of innovation o ered by the re ection of these philosophers, the Author choses to analyze the topic of substance, considered by philosophers since the classical antiquity. She will show brie y how this con- cept has been changed in the history of thought, culminating in the elaboration developed by Anscombe. In the conclusion the Author shows the fallacy and the strong points of the problem. (shrink)

: How do people make decisions? Previous psychological research consistently shed light on the fact that decisions are not the result of a pure rational reasoning, and that emotions can assume a crucial role. This is particularly true in the case of moral decision-making, which requires a complex integration of affective and cognitive processes. One question that is still open to debate concern the individual factors that can affect moral decisions. Gender has been consistently identified as a possible variable of (...) interest for the adoption of different strategic behaviors, with men using more rational processes and women more deontological principles. In the present study we aimed at exploring the presence of gender differences in different decision-making scenarios. Results showed that the moral scenario led to a similar acceptance rate in both genders, while economic and shopping offers were more likely to be accepted by men. Also, women were more inclined to refuse unfair offers, which included a higher personal benefit at the expense of the opponent, even if this meant a total loss for both parties. Finally, correlational analyses revealed a different relation between risk propensity and decision-making in men and women in different scenarios. Keywords: Decision-making; Utilitarianism; Altruism; Moral Decision-making; Economic Decision-making Decisioni morali, economiche e d’acquisto a confronto. Effetti di genere e utilitarismo Riassunto: Come prendiamo le decisioni? La letteratura psicologica disponibile ha chiarito in ampia misura come le decisioni non siano il risultato di un ragionamento puramente razionale e che le emozioni possono assumere un ruolo cruciale. Questo è particolarmente vero nel caso delle decisioni morali, che richiedono una complessa integrazione tra processi affettivi e cognitivi. Una questione ancora aperta riguarda i fattori individuali che possono incidere sulle decisioni morali. Il genere è stato identificato come una possibile variabile da considerare rispetto all’adozione di comportamenti strategici differenti, in cui gli uomini sembrano più inclini a far uso di processi razionali e le donne a considerare principi deontologici. In questo lavoro abbiamo provato a esplorare la presenza di differenze di genere in diversi contesti decisionali. I risultati hanno mostrano come in ambito morale entrambi i generi siano portati ad accettare opzioni simili, mentre offerte economiche e commerciali sono accettate in misura maggiore dagli uomini. Le donne sarebbero più inclini a rifiutare offerte inique che comprendono benefici personali maggiori a discapito di una controparte, anche se questo implica una perdita totale da ambo le parti. Infine, le analisi correlazionali hanno mostrato una diversa relazione tra propensione al rischio e processi decisionali tra uomini e donne in contesti diversi. Parole chiave: Processi decisionali; Utilitarismo; Altruismo; Processi decisionali morali; Processi decisionali economici. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 475 whereas in some texts Aquinas explicitly teaches that the higher senses of vision and hearing are the ones that mainly (praecipue, principaliter) lead to aesthetic experience.t5 Moreover, the statement that only in the thirteenth century was the question of the distinction between the higher and lower senses explicitly raised (p. l13f.), is true only if the author meant to exclude the pre-medieval or patristic as well (...) as the ancient period of philosophy.16 Finally, there is one technical weakness in this book that cannot be left unmentioned. The overwhelming majority of references are not to the original medieval texts treated and/or quoted in the three-volume edition, but to the number of volume and page in that edition. Thus the reader must be both familiar with French and in possession of the original three-volume work, or remain hopelessly frustrated every time he wishes to consult the original texts or at least know which texts are being mentioned. Yet, if one knows French, he does not need the English translation; and if he is also fortunate enough to have access to the original three-volume version, he will not need the abridged version of the original work at all. For this reason, should there be a second edition of this translation, the references should be changed from the l~tudes to the original medieval works. Although the negative remarks are more lengthy in this review than the positive evaluation is, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the defects outweigh the value of the book. As a matter of fact, upon finishing the reading of this translation of De Bruyne's work, this reviewer was left with the conviction that, in the final balance, the reader can only greatly benefit from this work, and we all owe gratitude to the translator for having made this highly informative work available in the English language. FRANCIS J. KOVACH University of Oklahoma 1~ Summ. theol. I-II,27,1,ad 3; In Psalm. 44,2. ~6 Cf. Plato, Hipp. maL 298 A; Gorg. 474 D; Leg. XII, 961 D; Aristotle, De an. III,3, 429a 3; Augustine, De lib. arb. II,7, 16-19; 14,38; De ord. II,ll, etc. Le origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento. By Angelo Crescini. (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965. Published by the Istituto di Filosofia, Facnlt~ di Lettere e Filosofia of the Universit~ degli Studi di Trieste. Pp. 340. L 5,000) Professor Crescini has certainly picked a topic of great interest upon which to write. Recent students of Renaissance logic such as N. W. Gilbert, V. Mufioz Delgado, W. Ong, G. Papuli, W. Risse, and C. Vasoli have pointed out the vitality and significance associated with the development of the logical thought of the period. The general question of methodology has produced an enormous scholarly literature in recent years,I but much remains to be done before we fully understand how various methodologies have evolved and what relation philosophical discussions of method have had to the actual practice of science. Therefore, it would be most desirable to have a 1 For further information see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science 7 (1968), 1-63. 476 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY detailed, comprehensive, and accurate study of the evolution of analytic method during the sixteenth century, particularly in view of the significance taken on by such a methodology with the 'rise of modern science'. With such a background in view the reviewer comes to this volume in anticipation of being generally enlightened on various matters. Unfortunately, Crescini's book is on the whole disappointing, although nearly everyone will find the odd bit of information of which he was not previously aware. It definitely does not, however, establish a solid foundation for later studies. The book is organized into three principal parts, dealing with the development of the analytic method in logic (pp. 21-188), in the natural sciences (pp. 189-284), and in mathematics (vv. 285-328). The first section treats discussions of the topic among writers on logical subject, under which heading are included 'humanist' logicians such as... (shrink)

This paper aims at comparing the traditional picture of visual perception with the emergent sensorimotor picture, taking colour perception as a case study. The framework put forward by Thompson (1995) takes into account computational objectivism and neurphysiological subjectivism first, then elaborates on the sensorimotor alternative. I’ll follow the same path, adding some arguments to the relational ontology implied by the sensorimotor advocates.

Fin dall’antichità esiste una tensione tra filosofia e letteratura, a cui David Hume ha dato voce dicendo che i poeti sono «mentitori per professione»: i testi letterari, in quanto opere di finzione che parlano di persone che non sono mai esistite e di eventi che non sono mai accaduti, non contengono proposizioni vere. Ciò implica, però, che essi sono privi di qualsiasi valore cognitivo. Questo articolo cerca di mostrare che tale atteggiamento anticognitivista si basa su una concezione errata del progresso (...) cognitivo, che lo riduce a un accumulo di dati. Quando apprendiamo da un testo letterario, invece, è perché esso ci offre nuove prospettive, approfondisce la nostra comprensione o ci invita a riflettere e ad arrivare a conclusioni nostre.There is an old tension between philosophy and literature that has been brought to the point by David Hume who stated that poets are «liars by profession». Literary texts, as works of fiction that talk about people who have never lived and events that have never taken place, do not contain true propositions and hence do not have any cognitive value. This article aims to show that the anticognitivistic argument is based on a false conception of cognitive progress, which reduces learning to the acquisition of information. We can learn from literary texts, however, because they offer new perspectives, deepen our understanding and invite us to reflect and arrive at our own conclusions. (shrink)